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Kent McNeil, “Indigenous and Crown Sovereignty in Canada”, a talk given at
the University of Saskatchewan College of Law, 24 October 2019
Peter Russell, a prominent Canadian political scientist, tells of the time he met with
Dene leaders on his first visit to the Northwest Territories in 1974. A Dene woman
opened the discussion by asking: “Professor Russell, I have two questions for you:
What is sovereignty? And how did the Queen get it over us?” Years later, he
described his response: “For the first question, I had a nice, pat answer based on
Bodin, Hobbes, and my understanding of European international law. But I
stumbled over the second. The truth of the matter is that I didn’t have a clue how
Queen Victoria and her Canadian henchmen had ‘got sovereignty’ over the Dene.”1
Later, he said he “came to know that the right answer to the Dene woman’s second
question was – in a word – ‘trickery.’ Or, to use the more ironic concept I learned
from an Australian Aboriginal friend, it was ‘the white man’s legal magic’ that did
the trick.”2
In international law, sovereignty entails exclusive authority over a territory and
everyone and everything in it, independently of any other authority. In theory, at
least, nation states are sovereign and equal. They are independent of one another
and are not supposed to interfere in the internal affairs of other nation states.
This concept of state sovereignty has been breaking down somewhat in recent
times. For example, by forming the European Union member states have given up
some of their authority to the European Parliament, which is elected directly by
approximately 375 million eligible voters. Discontent over this partial transfer of
sovereignty to the European Parliament is one of the motivating forces behind
Brexit in the United Kingdom.
Another way in which state sovereignty is being weakened is in the area of
humanitarian intervention. The shocking mass killings in Rwanda in the1990s
caused this question to be raised: In what circumstances do nation states have an
obligation to intervene in the internal affairs of other states to stop serious abuses
of human rights? At the 2005 World Summit of the United Nations, a global
political commitment was endorsed, known as the Responsibility to Protect, to
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prevent crimes against humanity, including ethnic cleansing, genocide, and war
crimes.3
These inroads into state sovereignty are relatively recent developments. Earlier on,
as the modern concept of sovereignty grew out of the creation of independent
nation states in Western Europe, the absolute independence of nation states became
a fundamental pillar of the law of nations, as international law used to be called.
This system of states with legal personality in the European law of nations was
acknowledged by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.
Before proceeding further, I think it is important to make a couple of important
distinctions. The first is between sovereignty, also called territorial title, and title
to land. Sovereignty involves political jurisdiction – the authority to make and
enforce laws and exercise administrative control over a territory.
Title to land involves property rights within a territory. Property rights are
generally a matter of domestic law, whereas sovereignty is a matter of domestic
and international law. Property can be either public – for example, Crown lands in
Canada – or private, such as fee simple estates held by individuals or corporations.
So when the British Crown got sovereignty over Canada, it did not necessarily get
title to all the land. If the Indigenous peoples had Aboriginal title, in Canadian
domestic law all the Crown got in terms of property rights was the underlying or
radical title, as a result of the common law doctrine of tenure.4
The other important distinction is between external and internal sovereignty. In
international law, a sovereign has both – externally, it can interact with other
sovereigns by entering into treaties, defending its borders, and so on. Internally, it
has full governmental authority (subject today to the Responsibility to Protect and
limitations in places like the European Union), but this authority can be divided, as
it is in federal systems. In Canada, internal sovereignty is divided among the
federal government, the provincial governments, and, I would argue, Indigenous
governments. In the United States, it is divided among the federal government, the
fifty states, the Indian nations, and, some would say, the people.
How do nation states acquire sovereignty over new territory? In international law,
by what I would call either derivative or original means. In the past, if a territory
3
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already had an acknowledged sovereign, another sovereign could take it by
conquest or acquire it by a treaty of cession. These are derivative means, whereby
sovereignty is either taken or transferred from a pre-existing sovereign.
If there was no acknowledged, pre-existing sovereign, the territory could be
acquired by effective occupation, an original means. European nations also
purported to acquire sovereignty over territories in other parts of the world by
discovery, papal grants, symbolic acts of possession, and royal charters, but there
was never any agreement over the effectiveness of these various means of asserting
sovereignty.5
Prescription, another means of acquiring sovereignty, would appear to be
derivative in the sense that there was a pre-existing sovereign, and original in the
sense that sovereignty was acquired by effective occupation for a sufficiently long
time, not by conquest or transfer from the earlier sovereign.
Getting back to North America, were the Indigenous peoples sovereign before the
Europeans arrived? This takes us to the distinction between de facto and de jure
sovereignty. De facto sovereignty depends on the actual exercise of authority on
the ground. It involves control of a territory by (1) not allowing outsiders and
goods in without permission (i.e., border control), (2) establishing and enforcing
laws, (3) administrative action, and (4) in modern times, by construction of
infrastructure such as railways and roads and by provision of government services
such as a postal system, etc. But these kinds of factors have to be assessed in
accordance with the society in question and their way of life, not by Eurocentric
standards.
I have no doubt that the Indigenous nations had de facto sovereignty over their
territories prior to European colonization. Although the boundaries may not have
always been precise, those nations exercised political and physical control over
specific territories and had laws governing the use of resources and the
relationships among clans, families, and individuals. They entered into treaties
with their neighbors and sometimes went to war with them. They may not have
had a concept of sovereignty that was the same as the European concept that
See John Thomas Juricek, “English Claims in North America to 1660: A Study in Legal and Constitutional
History” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1970); Patricia Seed, Ceremonies of Possession in European
Conquest of the New World, 1492–1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Brian Slattery, “Paper
Empires: The Legal Dimensions of French and English Ventures in North America,” in John McLaren, A.R. Buck,
& Nancy E. Wright, eds., Despotic Dominion: Property Rights in British Settler Societies (Vancouver: UBC Press,
2005), 50.
5
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became entrenched in the European law of nations around the time of the Treaty of
Westphalia, but they exercised as much authority as European sovereigns
exercised.
De facto sovereignty does not depend on the existence of any particular form of
government – Indigenous peoples were organized politically and socially in vastly
different ways. What matters is that they were organized socially and politically
and exercised authority and control over their peoples and territories. This is the
conclusion the International Court of Justice came to in 1975 in the Western
Sahara case.6
The way authority was exercised in Indigenous nations was no doubt very different
from the way it was exercised in Europe at the time of colonization of North
America. Individuals usually had a lot more personal freedom than in Europe.
Indigenous laws and social norms were not usually enforced by coercion, but by
example, persuasion, shaming, ostracism, and so on. Only in extreme cases was
corporal punishment or death administered. Imprisonment was not generally used
as a form of punishment. Of course, the methods used to enforce Indigenous law
could vary greatly from one nation to another.
The point is that the ways in which Indigenous nations governed themselves are
not relevant to deciding whether they had de facto sovereignty. Instead, what
counts is the fact that they did govern themselves by exercising political authority
and controlling territory.
But did they have de jure sovereignty? To answer this question, one first has to
ask, in what system of law, because de jure sovereignty, unlike de facto
sovereignty, is relative.
The best example of the relativity of de jure sovereignty I have been able to find is
the situation in Rhodesia – now Zimbabwe – in the period of the racist regime of
Ian Smith from the time of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in
1965 to 1980.
There can be little doubt that the Smith regime had de facto sovereignty in
Rhodesia after the UDI in 1965 (before that, Rhodesia had been a British colony).
But what about de jure sovereignty? Well, it depends on what legal system one
chooses to apply.
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In international law, Rhodesia was not a sovereign state because the international
community did not accept the UDI and refused to recognize Rhodesia. Likewise in
English law: English courts ruled that the UDI was illegal. But in Rhodesian
domestic law, Rhodesia was a sovereign state because the local courts, after some
hesitation, accepted the legitimacy of the Smith regime.
So we have a situation where de facto sovereignty resulted in de jure sovereignty
in Rhodesia, but not in the United Kingdom or the rest of the world. So de jure
sovereignty is a relative matter, depending on which legal system one chooses to
apply.
Returning to North America, if the Indigenous nations had de facto sovereignty
prior to European colonization, what system of law should be used to determine
whether they had de jure sovereignty? Surely not the domestic law of the
colonizing European powers – they exercised no authority in North America prior
to colonization, so their laws could not have applied here.
What about international law? Colonization of North America began at the
beginning of the 17th century. At the time, international law – or the law of
nations, as it was called up until around 1800 – was still in its infancy. It was still
being developed by the nations of Europe to govern their relations with one
another. Hugo Grotius’ major work, On the Law of War and Peace, was only
published in 1625, and the Treaty of Westphalia was not entered into until the
middle of the 17th Century.
Not only that, but the “nations” to which the “law of nations” applied were the
European nations, not the Indigenous nations of North America. The Indigenous
nations had no part in developing the law of nations and were simply outside its
scope.
Natural law jurists such as Grotius may have thought that the law of nations was
universal and applied throughout the world, but given that this law was used to
justify colonialism it can hardly be regarded as being part of the natural order of
things. Moreover, by the end of the 18th Century, legal positivism had pretty much
replaced natural law theories. For the positivists, like Jeremy Bentham who
apparently coined the new designation “international law”, this law came from the
positive actions of states. It grew out of state practice and convention (treaties),
rather than out of the natural order of the world.
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Given all this, the sovereign status of the Indigenous nations in North America
cannot have been determined on the basis of the law of nations or international
law. So for the Indigenous nations to have had de jure sovereignty prior to
European colonization, it must have been in their own systems of law. There are
two relevant systems here: (1) the domestic law of each Indigenous nation, and (2)
the inter-nation law that governed their relations with one another.
But we do have to be careful here because Indigenous peoples may not have had a
concept of sovereignty equivalent to the European concept, which as we have seen
really developed after the emergence of independent nation states – in particular
France, England, Spain, and Portugal – in the latter half of the Middle Ages.
Nonetheless, the Indigenous nations of North America no doubt regarded
themselves as independent entities that exercised authority over specific territories,
which is what sovereignty is all about.
So to conclude this part, I think the Indigenous nations in North America had both
de facto sovereignty and something resembling de jure sovereignty in their own
systems of law at the time of European colonization.
Now let’s come back to the second question the Dene woman asked Peter Russell:
How did the Europeans acquire sovereignty in North America?
The answer Chief Justice Marshall of the Supreme Court of the United States gave
in Johnson v. McIntosh7 in 1823 was “discovery”. He said the colonizing
European nations all agreed that sovereignty over territories occupied by
Indigenous peoples in North America could be acquired by this means, but in fact
there was no such agreement. As already mentioned, the European powers made
conflicting claims based on discovery, papal grants, symbolic acts of possession,
royal charters, and so on, without ever agreeing on the effectiveness of these
various methods. In reality, effective occupation was the only means of original
acquisition that came to be accepted and incorporated into international law.
Moreover, Marshall C.J.’s judgment is internally contradictory because he
acknowledged the pre-existing sovereignty of the Indian nations. Discovery, when
followed by possession, would have been an original means of acquiring
sovereignty, but if the Indigenous peoples were sovereign before, then logically the
European powers would have had to acquire sovereignty derivatively from them by
conquest or cession.
7
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I think Chief Justice Marshall became aware of this contradiction in his judgment
and sought to redress it nine years later in Worcester v. Georgia.8 In that case, he
acknowledged that the Cherokees and other Indian nations were sovereign and
independent prior to the arrival of the Europeans. The doctrine of discovery, he
said in this case, applied only among the European nations that had agreed to it.
Consistently with the international law rule that treaties bind only the parties,9 he
acknowledged that the doctrine of discovery did not apply to the Indigenous
nations because they had not agreed to it. Consequently, it could not have
diminished their pre-existing rights, whether to sovereignty or to the lands they
occupied and owned. In this way, I think Marshall C.J. acknowledged the
relativity of de jure sovereignty. The de jure sovereignty the Europeans
supposedly acquired by discovery applied only among themselves.
Unfortunately, Marshall C.J.’s new insight on this issue got ignored and the
doctrine of discovery has become imbedded in American law as the foundation for
American sovereignty over areas not acquired derivatively from France, Spain,
Mexico, and Russia. It has been applied not only to the eastern Thirteen Colonies,
but also to the Oregon Territory, which has been taken to have been acquired by
the discovery of the estuary of the Columbia River by American Captain Robert
Gray in 1792 and Lewis and Clark’s overland journey to the Northwest Coast and
back in 1804-1806.
The doctrine of discovery has been severely criticized10 – it is disgraceful that a
doctrine based on racist perceptions of European superiority remains to this day the
ground for American claims to sovereignty over the eastern United States and
Oregon, Washington, and Idaho. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in
Canada, in its 2015 Report, also condemned the doctrine of discovery and
recommended that it be discarded.11
So how did the Crown acquire sovereignty in Canada?
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The standard answer is that the British Crown acquired sovereignty in Acadia
(Nova Scotia) by cession from France by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, and over
the rest of French Canada by conquest on the Plains of Abraham in 1759 and
cession from France by the Treaty of Paris, 1763. But how did France acquire
sovereignty? Not by conquest of or cession from the Indigenous peoples, because
that never happened. In the St. Catherine’s case in 1887, Justice Taschereau of the
Supreme Court of Canada said New France had been acquired by discovery, but in
the appeal decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London no
reference was made to how France acquired its North American colonies.12
The rest of Canada was supposedly acquired by settlement, the British colonial
equivalent of effective occupation. This implies that the Indigenous peoples were
not sovereign, but of course this was only from the Crown’s perspective. Acting
on this assumption, Charles II, by Royal Charter in 1670, purported to grant all the
lands draining into Hudson Bay and Strait, as well as governmental authority over
that vast territory which was named Rupert’s Land after the king’s cousin, to a
private company, the Hudson’s Bay Company. At the time, all the English had
done was sail around Hudson Bay, land at a few places and trade for furs, and
establish a trading post at the mouth of the Rupert River. The interior and the
extent of the Rupert’s Land grant were entirely unknown to them.
What are we to make of this? Did the Crown already have sovereignty over this
territory as a result of a few voyages of discovery into Hudson Bay? Did the Royal
Charter itself extend Crown sovereignty over Rupert’s Land? I think the better
view is that the Charter was prospective – it gave the company the authority to take
possession of Rupert’s Land, if it was able to do so. This was the interpretation
suggested by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the Ontario Boundary
Case of 1884, in comments to counsel during argument of the case.13
In actual fact, the Hudson’s Bay Company did not take possession of much of
Rupert’s Land in the 200 years that it purported to hold the territory before
surrendering it back to the Crown in 1870. Apart from the Red River Settlement at
the forks of the Red and Assiniboine Rivers and the company’s trading posts on

St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company v. The Queen (1887), 13 S.C.R. 577, affirmed (1888), 14 App. Cas.
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Hudson and James Bays and at a few locations on rivers and lakes in the interior,
the real possessors of the territory were the First Nations and the Métis.
In 1870, the Hudson’s Bay Company surrendered Rupert’s Land back to the
British Crown, which then transferred it to Canada, along with the adjacent NorthWestern Territory. That’s the usual story of how Canada acquired sovereignty
over northern Ontario and northern Quebec, the Prairie Provinces, and the
mainland territories north of the 60th parallel.
Canada then entered into the eleven numbered treaties with the Indigenous nations
in these territories. These agreements covered northern Ontario, the three Prairie
Provinces, northeastern British Columbia, and part of the Yukon and the NorthWest territories. From the Crown’s perspective, it already had sovereignty over
these regions, but needed to enter into treaties to get surrenders of First Nation
lands. The Indigenous peoples’ understanding is different: they generally thought
the treaties were political agreements between nations whereby they were agreeing
to share sovereignty and land with the Crown and European settlers.14 These
different understandings of the treaties remain unresolved to this day.
What about British Columbia?
It was a separate British colony that only joined Canada in 1871, four years after
Confederation. It has generally been regarded as having been acquired by
settlement, the equivalent of effective occupation in international law.
What has the Supreme Court of Canada had to say about this?
In the Sparrow decision in 1990, Chief Justice Dickson and Justice La Forest, for a
unanimous Court, said in reference to British Columbia that “there was from
the outset never any doubt that sovereignty and legislative power, and indeed the
underlying title, to [Aboriginal title] lands vested in the Crown” (they did not
specify when “the outset” might have been).15 For authority, they cited Johnson v.
McIntosh, so they seem to have relied, at least implicitly, on the doctrine of
discovery.
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Then in the Delgamuukw case in 1997,16 and more recently in Tsilhqot’in Nation in
2014,17 the Court accepted 1846 as the year of Crown acquisition of sovereignty.
Why 1846? That was the year of the Oregon Boundary Treaty, whereby Britain
and the United States settled their claims over that part of North America and
established the boundary along the 49th parallel from the Rocky Mountains to the
Strait of Georgia (now the Salish Sea). This extended the international boundary
that had previously been established along the 49th parallel from the Lake of the
Woods to the Rocky Mountains when these two nation states entered into the
Convention of Commerce in 1818.
But how could a bilateral treaty between the United States and Britain give the
Crown sovereignty over Indigenous peoples, including the Gitxsan, Wet’suwet’en,
and Tsilhqot’in Nations, who were involved in Delgamuukw and Tsilhqot’in
Nation cases? As mentioned earlier, international treaties bind only the parties,
and the Indigenous peoples of North America would have been outside the scope
of American, British, and international law, at least until de facto sovereignty was
acquired over their territories by one of those colonizing nations.18
In Haida Nation, a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court in 2004,19 Chief
Justice McLachlin acknowledged, for the first time, the pre-existing sovereignty of
the Indigenous nations in British Columbia.20 But if they were sovereign, how
could the Crown have acquired sovereignty over them by discovery, a treaty with
the United States, or mere assertion? The Supreme Court has not provided any
answer to this question. Instead, the judges seem to prefer to avoid it – apparently
it is too political.
In Australia, the response of the High Court has been that the Crown acquired
sovereignty by act of state whenever and wherever it purported to do so, and the
courts can’t question this – it is outside domestic courts’ jurisdiction.21 This is a
convenient way for courts to avoid the issue, but it doesn’t mean the Crown’s
16
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acquisition of sovereignty was legal or legitimate – it just can’t be questioned by
the courts, whose jurisdiction depends on Crown sovereignty.
From a de facto perspective, the Crown clearly exercises jurisdiction over Canada
today, and this de facto sovereignty is acknowledged by the international
community, so the Crown must have de jure sovereignty in international law, but
this does not mean it has de jure sovereignty in Indigenous law.
How did the Crown get sovereignty in international law? Not by conquest of the
Indigenous peoples22 or by cession from them because the treaties did not purport
to entail cession of sovereignty. And if Indigenous peoples were sovereign prior to
the arrival of Europeans, not by settlement or effective occupation. That leaves
prescription, but my understanding is that it requires acquiescence by the previous
sovereign,23 and the Indigenous peoples in what is now Canada do not appear to
have acquiesced in the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty.
In the Haida Nation case in 2004, Chief Justice McLachlin suggested that “preexisting Aboriginal sovereignty” on the one hand, and the Crown’s “asserted
sovereignty” and “de facto control of land and resources that were formerly in the
control” of the Indigenous peoples on the other, have to be reconciled through
honourable negotiations and modern-day treaties that deal with these issues.24 In
my opinion, this is the appropriate way forward, but political will and commitment
on the part of Canada is required for this reconciliation to become a reality.
Thank you for your kind attention.
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